I don't think the Betamax analogy works, however, because this is a direct infringement case rather than a contributory infringement case. (The complaint refers only to Google "ma[king] and reproduc[ing] for its own commercial use a copy of some of the literary works contained in the University of Michigan library.") If Google was making available a tool that allowed users to download and view snippets from some other, non-Google source, then that would be analogous. But this is more like the MP3.com case; Google is making complete copies of copyrighted works and placing them on its servers. And it's also different from copies made in the ordinary course of computer or network operations, such as Google's existing website. One can argue, in the context of the internet, that an implied license for search engine crawlers and temporary copies made by browsers exists, unless specifically disclaimed, merely by placing a non-password-protected page on the Internet. (Thus, I don't buy Larry Lessig's argument about Google today.) But I don't think you can infer a comparable implied license from the sale of a hard copy book to a library.