In the 700 MHz auction filings (my current obsession), Frontline draws [warning, large pdf of reply comments] a sharp distinction between its suggested "open access" rules for a fraction of this part of the airwaves, on the one hand, and "network neutrality," on the other.

This is in response to (apparently) poisonous language from Verizon (and others), saying that "Frontline is a stalking horse for net neutrality and other unprecedented and unjustified mandates."

Frontline's argument is that its suggested "open access" rules aren't "network neutrality" because (1) NN would operate retrospectively, affecting entities who have already invested in particular network setups, (2) NN would be broad, affecting all internet access.  "Open access," by contrast, isn't either - it would operate only prospectively, because any applicants for this part of the airwaves would know about this license condition, and it would apply to only this little bit (10 MHz) of the auctioned spectrum, not all highspeed internet access.  So far, so clear.

So what is open access, in Frontline's view?  It doesn't necessarily mean that any particular device could simply hop onto the network, as far as I can tell.  All devices (and perhaps all users) would have to be authenticated and authorized for particular uses of the network. 

Why?  To ensure compliance with law enforcement needs like CALEA and E911.  There's an appendix to the Frontline set of comments I've linked to above that makes that clear.  I'm not saying this is a problem - not at all - but it is interesting.  It appears that Frontline anticipates that, ultimately, a single national actor will have the ability to isolate and provide to law enforcement the packet stream coming from a particular device.

"[A]ssuming a single entity were in operational control of a given open-access network [like the one proposed as a license condition for these 10 MHz], all packets in a given stream could be easily captured [for law enforcement purposes].  This would not, however, necessarily be the case in an uncoordinated network, such as the Internet."

The advantage of this approach from an innovation point of view is clear:  it means that rather than design devices and applications and other parts of the ecosystem to match law enforcement's needs, you simply provide law enforcement with a stream of packets (after they've presented an appropriate warrant) and let them figure out what's going on.  But the downside is that there will be a single entity who will be in operational control of the entire nationwide network, and will be uniquely in the position to authenticate and authorize devices.

The proposed rules drafted by Frontline provide:

The E Block Licensee shall be prohibited from blocking users from accessing services or content provided by unaffiliated parties, or otherwise engaging in unreasonable discrimination against such services or content, except with the consent of the user or as required by law. The E Block Licensee shall offer on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis network quality-of-service capabilities to Internet content, application, and service providers. The requirements of this paragraph shall apply to all licenses owned or controlled by the E Block licensee.
. . .
The E Block Licensee may not block the connection of any terminal equipment to the network provided that the terminal equipment complies with specifications published and filed with the Commission by the E Block Licensee, except that such terminal equipment shall not cause harm to the network or to uses of the network.

So here's the question:  what specifications will the new licensee state?  Does it matter?  Maybe not.  After all, right now it's very tricky to get incumbent wireless carriers to approve a particular handset.  Maybe it's better to have everything filed with the FCC and public, rather than secret and private.

But it's pretty clear that Frontline does anticipate a lot of authentication and authorization in the future.