Someone called me today to ask me what I thought about the connection (if any) between privacy and the recent CALEA ruling.

There are at least three possible responses I came up with -- only two of which I gave on the phone (things are always clearer after you hang up, aren't they?).  One is that CALEA is just about how things are designed, not whether law enforcement is entitled to ask service providers for data.  CALEA says "assuming a lawful warrant is being implemented, we want to make it easier for law enforcement to get access to data."  On this reading, extending CALEA to more services and more connections shouldn't make a difference to individual privacy vis-a-vis governmental requests for data -- government has to go to a judicial officer to get authority to ask for the data in the first place.

A second response, though, is that we have no idea how the FCC's adventurous extension of CALEA will change the privacy landscape.  The ongoing NSA scandal reveals that we don't know what this Administration is willing to do without a warrant.  We don't know how closely service providers are already cooperating with law enforcement/national security requests without needing the entire apparatus of warrants and judges.  We are in the dark.  In the dark, you can't see the change between one privacy regime and another -- it all looks the same.

A third response is that it's likely that extending CALEA's scope diminishes our privacy.  If it's easier for government to get access to data, because things have been designed in advance so as to be easily tappable, they'll get more data and will know more about us.  At the least, extending CALEA clearly doesn't heighten privacy protection in this country.

What do you think?

Net Neutrality is Bad for National Preparedness, says Center for Advanced Studies

NEW YORK, June 12 /U.S. Newswire/ -- In a research brief published by the World Policy Institute's Global Information Society Project, K.A.Taipale, executive director of the Center for Advanced Studies, Science & Technology Policy, asks whether imposing strict net neutrality regulation on telecommunications providers could put public safety and economic recovery at risk in times of national emergency.

How quickly can an innovation policy question be morphed into a security issue?  Answer:  Almost instantly.

All the incumbents familiar to us in internet policy questions -- law enforcement, Hollywood, and the telcos -- share an interest in deep packet inspection.  They all want to protect their existing, old-world business models. 

Law enforcement wants deep packet inspection because they have an insatiable desire for information (even if they have trouble parsing what they get).  Hollywood wants it because they want to know who's watching their movies, so they can shield their distribution windows.  And the dominant telcos want it so they can prioritize traffic and cableize internet access.

Watch this move.  We'll be seeing much more of this.  DHS would like to ensure that its packets get priority.  They'd like to change the essential internet protocols to make this possible.  As a society, we have to decide whether ensuring security (of DHS, of Hollywood, of the telcos) is worth the costs to our future such tinkering will cause.