Last week's silent (passive) decision by the FCC to release Verizon from its common carriage obligations to companies is worth digging through.

As far as I can tell, back in 2004 Verizon claimed that it was a non-dominant provider of broadband services because it was in such intense competition with cable companies.  It asked for forbearance from the application of all Title II (presumably including CALEA and CPNI and Part 68, and certainly including unbundling obligations) and Computer Inquiry rules to it.

Even though Verizon apparently didn't provide any hard data about its non-dominance in particular geographic markets; even though it provides the only loop to many many commercial buildings; even though it got specific about what services it was talking about only six weeks before the FCC's decision; even though just a few months ago the FCC rejected Verizon's request; and even though Verizon made promises in connection with its merger with MCI that are apparently now trumped -- despite all of this, and opposition from many quarters (including from inside the Commission), the Commission decided to move ahead.

It's enough to make you lose faith in the administrative process.

From what I've heard here in New Zealand, there's a move towards structural separation -- making the pipe just a pipe, and requiring it to interconnect with everyone else who wants to provide services.  The benefit of structural separation, as opposed to common carriage tariffing rules, is that the separated entity can immediately make clear the cost of its services without having a prolonged rate-setting proceeding.

Of course, I'm here in New Zealand to work on ICANN matters, and I've had a big day of them.  But I'm still amazed at this Verizon step back at home.  More about ICANN later.