Nuvio has filed an appeal [pdf] from the FCC's E911 order directed at "interconnected VoIP" services.  I'm glad that someone is taking on the E911 order, and Nuvio has done a good job.  Their argument:  "It's a good idea to implement E911, but we can't possibly do this in four months--no one can. The wireless industry has been working on this for years and years, and they're still not finished.  But you're forcing us to cut off our customers if we don't comply on this unreasonable schedule."  A more internet-minded approach may animate attacks by others on the E911 order -- after all, getting away from the legacy physical infrastructure now used for E911 might lead to services that were much more flexible and information-rich.  But Nuvio has started us off on the "it's impossible" front.

In June 2005, the FCC issued an order mandating that, within four months, a particular category of online voice services (which it called “interconnected VoIP”) supply “enhanced 911” (or “E911”) capabilities to their customers. The E911 Order, in a nutshell, requires "interconnected VoIP" providers to deliver their customers' 911 calls to a "local" emergency operator, and to provide that operator with the callback number and location information of the customer. (The ability to provide location information and a callback number is the difference between ordinary 911 services and “enhanced” 911 services.)

There were many many problems with the FCC's E911 Order.  The E911 Order did not set rates or otherwise control what the essential facility provider—the incumbent local telephone company, access to whose lines would be needed for such emergency services to function—could do to hold up a VoIP provider seeking access to the special emergency communications equipment whose use the E911 Order mandated.  The FCC said it would not shield "interconnected VoIP" providers from liability under state laws for mistakes occurring in connection with provision of emergency services.  (Telephony providers, both wired and wireless, do have such liability protections by statute.)  Not surprisingly, the E911 Order moves a social policy designed for telephony directly into the internet context, with very few efforts at customization.

Mandating that VoIP providers make available E911 services to consumers within four months was impossible (or nearly impossible) to do for most of the entities that make such voice services available, for several reasons.   The existing 911 infrastructure in the US (which is connected to but largely separate from the traditional phone network) is extremely antiquated, to the point where even wireless companies have had great difficulty implementing 911. The 911 network has not fundamentally changed since the 1970s. The E911 Order gives “interconnected VoIP” providers no new rights that will help them comply, and does not obligate local telephone companies to allow them to connect. VoIP service providers have no right to access emergency call centers, and most of these centers are owned by local telephone companies.   And the complexities of nomadic VoIP services (usable from any net connection anywhere in the world, using any area code, over any form of transport) make connection to the legacy E911 system difficult.

The complexities associated with requiring voice services running over the internet to provide E911 are mind-boggling.  To be sure, the FCC has issued this requirement only with respect to services that (1) enable real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) require a broadband connection from the user’s location; (3) require Internet Protocol-compatible equipment (a PC); and  (4) permit users generally to receive calls that originate on the traditional telephone network and to make calls to the traditional telephone network.   So a voice application that only sent data to the traditional telephone network, but did not receive data (was not itself accessed through a telephone number) would not be subject to this rule.  (At least for the moment – the FCC has said it will examine whether the scope of this mandate should broaden, and it is very likely that a broader category of online voice services will soon be subject to this rule.)  

But a free voice service that makes it possible for users to “call” traditional telephone numbers and receive “calls” from the network must find ways to get “location” and “callback” information to a “local” emergency center through a centrally-located and customized piece of hardware—the selective router.

The requirement of emergency services for online “voice” services fits perfectly with the telephony mindset.  From the very beginning of the history of telephony in the US, the essence of telephone service has been that it makes emergency help available from a central source.  Telephones are there to watch over us in our sleep.  Telephones are vigilant, centrally-controlled, located in an identifiable terrestrial place, and set up with services that the telephone company believes (or the government believes) are good ideas.  Those who are steeped in telephony strongly believe that any communications service offered to the public must provide access to emergency officials and that technological developments must not be allowed to avoid this regulatory requirement.

Even if it's impossible to comply.  Even if you end up with a service that doesn't work as well as a more technologically-sophisticated service would. 

[I've posted a draft paper about this here.]